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SUBSTANCE OVER FORM: THE CORNERSTONE OF
OUR TAX SYSTEM OR A LETHAL WEAPON
IN THE IRS'S ARSENAL?
by
RAY

A. KNIGHT, J.D., CPA
&

LEE G. KNIGHT, PH.D.*

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine holding that the substance of a transaction--rather than its mere
form--controls tax liability is widely, but often unpredictably, applied. The
doctrine may affect the amount of taxable income from any type of transaction, and
often settles questions of who is taxable on certain income. The Supreme Court has
incorporated the doctrine in numerous decisions, and the lower courts have
discussed and applied the rule extensively. The doctrine is also incorporated in
several sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
In the early 1920s, the Supreme Court treated the superiority of substance over
form as a well-settled principle in tax matters:
We recognize the importance of regarding matters of substance and
disregarding forms in applying the provisions of the Sixteenth
Amendment and income tax laws enacted thereunder. In a number
of cases we have under varying conditions followed the rule.'
(3) Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was
actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the participants... (4) [and w]hen applying the [provisions of the] Sixteenth
Amendment and income tax laws enacted [thereunder] we must
regard matters of substance and not mere form.2
Over thirty-five years later, the Fifth Circuit called the substance over form
principle "the cornerstone of sound taxation." 3 A critical review of the doctrine's
development, however, suggests that it also could be described as a "lethal weapon
Professors of Accounting, Middle Tennessee State University.
United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921).
2Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 242 (1924).

Weinert's Estate v. Commissioner 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961).
91
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in the IRS's arsenal." The IRS, rather than the taxpayer, normally raises the
substance versus form issue, and neither the courts nor the IRS have provided a
generally applicable answer to the question of whether substance should prevail over
form or form should prevail over substance. Moreover, not all cases involving the
substance versus form doctrine have been earmarked as such. Both the courts and
the IRS have used a number of ancillary tax principles--e.g., business purpose--to
create and shape the substance over form doctrine.
This article reviews the IRS and court usage of the substance over form
doctrine to determine its role in the federal tax system. The specific issue addressed
is whether the doctrine is the cornerstone of the federal tax system or merely another
lethal weapon in the IRS's arsenal. To accomplish this objective, the article focuses
on the doctrine's development in Supreme Court cases, and describes the primary
ancillary tax principles applied to create and shape the doctrine: ann 's-length versus
self-dealing, business purpose versus tax avoidance, and step versus independent
transaction treatment of a series of interrelated transactions. The issue of whether
form or substance generally prevails, and the right of the taxpayer to invoke the
doctrine are also addressed.
DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANCE OVER FORM DOCTRINE
IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The Supreme Court case most widely acknowledged as a source of first
principle on substance versus form is Gregory v. Helvering.4 Several subsequent
decisions, however, probably have had an equal impact on the current usage of the
terms.
Gregory v. Helvering
In Gregory, the taxpayer, Mrs. Gregory, held all of the stock of United
Mortgage Corporation, which in turn held the stock of Monitor Corporation.' Mrs.
Gregory wished to withdraw the Monitor stock from United so that she could sell
it without incurring tax liability.6 Since a straightforward distribution of the Monitor
securities to her in anticipation of the sale would have been taxable as a dividend,
she devised a scheme whereby the stock was transferred from United to a newly
formed subsidiary, Averill Corporation, in exchange for Averill's stock.7 United
then distributed Averill's stock to Mrs. Gregory in a transaction that qualified as a
tax-free spin-off or corporate reorganization under the Revenue Act of 1928.8 Mrs.
Gregory subsequently sold the Averill stock to a third party, recognizing long-term
4 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), affg Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2nd Cir. 1934).

- Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. at 467.
6Id.
7d.

' Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(i)(1)(b) (currently) I.R.C § 368(a)(1) (1991)), discussed in Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. at 468-69.
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sale.9

capital gain on the
After the series of transactions was complete, it was clear
that Mrs. Gregory had used the reorganization rules to secure capital gain treatment
for what, in substance was an ordinary dividend distribution. 10
The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) ignored the substance of the transaction and
upheld the tax-free corporate reorganization treatment on the ground that "a statute
[the reorganization statute] so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal
expression of tax policy." 1 In the BTA's view, Averill Corporation was entitled to
recognition, despite its transitory life as a vehicle to transfer the securities from
United Corporation to Mrs. Gregory, the sole shareholder. 12 The Second Circuit,
however, reversed the BTA's decision, holding that the transaction did not qualify
as a "reorganization" when the purpose of the statutory definition of that term was
taken into account. 13
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision, describing the
transaction as "an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a
corporate reorganization."14 In the Court's view, the purpose of the conveyance was
not to reorganize the business, but rather to transfer the original corporation's assets
to the shareholder, Mrs. Gregory. 5 With this decision, the Court created the
substance over form doctrine and the ancillary business purpose test discussed later
in this article.
Five Years Later
Five years after deciding Gregory, the Supreme Court touched on the
substance versus form question in two additional cases: Higgins v. Smith' 6 and
Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus Co.' 7 The issue in Higgins was whether the taxpayer
could deduct a loss on the sale of securities to a corporation wholly owned by the
taxpayer. The IRS argued that Gregory supported the "natural conclusion that
transactions, which do not vary control or change the flow of economic benefits, are
to be dismissed from consideration." 8 The taxpayers countered that Burnet v.
Commonwealth Improvement Co., 19 in which the Court held that a wholly owned
corporation was taxable on a gain realized on the sale of its stock to its shareholder,
supported the deduction of the loss.'

' Gregory v. Helvering,

293 U.S. at 467.

101d.

" Gregory v. Commissioner 27 BTA 223, 225 (1932), rev., 61 F.2d 809 (1936).
121d.
3Helvering,69 F.2d at 809.
M4Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
Id.

Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
"Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
'8 Higgins, 308 U.S. at 476.
"Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932)
20
Burnet,287 U.S. at 419-20.
16
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The Court agreed that Commonwealth Improvement required it to recognize
the separate identities of the corporation and its shareholders, but that if a tax
advantage resulted, the Government did not have to accept the form adopted by the
taxpayer. Instead, the Government "may look at actualities and upon determination
that the form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event
is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves
the purposes of the tax statute.', 21 Observing that "the command of income and its
benefits.. .marks the real owner of property," 22 the Court upheld the disallowance
of the claimed loss.
In F. &R. Lazarus, the taxpayer transferred title to two properties to a trustee
for land-trust certificates and leased the properties back for ninety-nine years, with
options to renew the leases and purchase the properties.23 Subsequently, the taxpayer
claimed depreciation deductions on the transferred properties. 24 The IRS contested
the deductions, arguing that the right to deduct depreciation follows legal title, and
25
thus, belonged to the trustee.
The Court upheld the taxpayer's claim in Lazarus, concurring with the trial
court's finding that the transactions involved were in substance mortgages rather
than sale-leasebacks.26 The Court pointed out that "in the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and
formal written documents are not rigidly binding.' '27
Shareholdersas Conduitsfor CorporateLiquidations
Two of the more significant Supreme Court cases involving the substance
versus form issue, Commissioner v. CourtHolding Co. 28 and U.S. v. Cumberland
PublicService Co.,2 9 involved the use of shareholders as mere conduits for the sale
of corporate assets. In CourtHolding, on the eve before signing a contract for the
sale of its only asset, the corporate taxpayer liquidated, and its shareholders
consummated the sale. Observing again that the "incidence of taxation depends
upon the substance of a transaction,'"I the Court upheld the trial court's conclusion
21Higgins, 308 U.S. at 477.
22 d. at 478.

Congress codified this result in the Revenue Act of 1934, § 24(a)(6) (currently I.R.C.

§ 267(1991)).
23 Helvering

v. F. & R. Lazarus Co., 308 U.S. at 253.

24 Id.
25 Id.

26Id. at 255.
27 Id.

2$
29

Commissioner v. Court Holdings Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1958).

30Commissioner v. Court holding Co., 324 U.S. at 334. See also Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S.

609 (1938) (cash received by a corporation and distributed, to its shareholders, with the understanding that
they would use it to discharge corporate debts held in substance not distributed, and thus taxable, to the

corporation).
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that the gain on the sale of the property was taxable to the corporate taxpayer.
Explaining its decision, the Court stated:
A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a sale
by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to pass title.
To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously
impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress."
Addressing essentially the same issue in CumberlandPublicService Co., the
Court held that the shareholders had made the sale after liquidation of the corporation. In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that the distinction
between Cumberland Public Service and Court Holding might be "particularly
shady and artificial," 32 but that the trial court's findings in Cumberland Public
Service warranted this distinction. The corporation was, in fact, liquidated before
the shareholders negotiated the sale of the assets in their own capacity. The IRS's
theory that the shareholders acted as mere conduits for the sale by the corporation
was inconsistent with these findings.
Deductibility of Losses on Sales Between Family Members
In McWilliams v. Commissioner3 3 the Court applies the substance over form
doctrine to a statute that prohibited a deduction for a loss on the sale of property,
directly or indirectly, between family members24 The husband and wife taxpayers
in McWilliams filed separate tax returns. 35 To establish a tax loss, one spouse used
36
the stock exchange to sell shares to an unrelated and unknown purchaser. Simultaneously, the other spouse used the stock exchange to purchase an equal number of
3
the same shares from an unrelated and unknown sellerY.
The Court agreed that in
form the sales were bona fide sales to strangers, but concluded that the substance of
the transactions amounted to indirect sales between family members.3" In the
Court's view, accepting the taxpayers' literal interpretation of the statute" would be
reading into it a crippling exception which is not there.' 39
Deductibility of Interest
4°
At issue in the 1946 companion cases of John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner
31Id. (footnote omitted). Revenue Act of 1954, § 337 provided that most gains realized by a corporation
on the sale of property in connection with its liquidation are not taxable. However, I.R.C. § 631 (a) (1986)
repealed this section of the 1954 Act.
32Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. at 454.
33McWilliams v. Commissioner 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
1 Revenue Act of 1938, § 24(b) (a) (currently I.R.C. § 267 (1991)).
3
5 McWilliams, 331 U.S. at 695.
36 1d.
37 d.
38

Id. at 703

391d.

40 John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
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and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner41 and the more recent cases of Knetsch v. U.S. 4 2
and FrankLyon v. U.S. 3was the deductibility of amounts paid in the form of interest, but argued by the IRS to be in substance nondeductible dividends, or worse,
merely a sham. FrankLyon also involved a depreciation deduction contested by the
IRS.
1. John Kelley and Talbot Mills
In John Kelley and Talbot Mills, the Court stated that "the wholly useless
temporary compliance with statutory literalness"44 found in Gregory was not present
in either of the cases. The purported debt in Kelley consisted of 8 percent
noncumulative income debentures subordinated to the claims of all other creditors.
In TalbotMills, the debt at issue consisted of notes bearing interest at a rate between
2 percent and 10 percent, depending upon corporate earnings. Finding the issue to

be more factual than legal, the Court upheld the Tax Court's conclusions that the
amounts paid on the Kelley debentures were deductible as interest, but that the
"interest" paid on the Talbot Mills notes was in substance a dividend.45
2. Knetsch
In the 1960 Knetsch case, the taxpayer purchased ten, thirty-year, 2.5 percent
deferred annuity savings bonds in an aggregate amount of $4 million.4" The taxpayer
paid for these bonds with a $4,000 check and a 3.5 percent nonrecourse note in the
amount of $4 million.47 At the date of purchase, the taxpayer prepaid the first year's
interest on the note, $140,000; issued 3.5 percent notes equal to the loan value of the
bonds, approximately $99,000; and prepaid interest of $3,465.48 The taxpayer
repeated this performance the next two years before terminating this arrangement in
the fourth year.49 At the termination date, the taxpayer received $1,000, which
represented the difference between the cash value of the bonds ($4,308,000) and the
amount owed ($4,307,000). 0
The point in contention in Knetsch was the deductibility of the interest
payments by the taxpayers in the first two years of the life of the bonds. The Court
agreed with the trial judge's findings that (1)"' [t]here was nocommercial economic
substance to the... transaction,' (2)'[n]o indebtedness of [the taxpayer] was created
41Id.

42 Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
43Frank Lyon v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
4
John Kelly, 326 U.S. at 525.
45
Id. at 530.
46Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362.
47Id.
4

9Id.at 363.

49 Id.
5

oId.
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by any of the... .transactions,' [and] (3)'[n]o economic gain could be achieved from
the purchase of these bonds without regard to the tax consequences.... ' In the
Court's view, what the taxpayer borrowed was in reality only a rebate of a substantial
part of what was labeled interest.5 2 Although acknowledging that some single
premium annuity arrangements with nontax substance might create indebtedness,
the Court concluded that "this one is a sham," 5 3 and thus, disallowed the claimed
interest deductions.3. FrankLyon
The 1978 FrankLyon55 case contains the Supreme Court's last word on the
substance versus form issue. The taxpayer financed the purchase of a bank building
with funds largely borrowed from an independent lender, and then leased the
building back to the bank at a rental just sufficient to service the loan. 56 Upon repayment of the loan and termination of the initial term of the lease, the bank had an
option to purchase the building for a fixed price--the building's fair market value as
estimated at the inception of the lease--or renew the lease at a reduced rental.57
At issue in the case was the taxpayer's right to deduct interest and depreciation. The Government contended that the sale and leaseback was simply a financing,
and that the taxpayer was acting merely as a conduit in passing on the "rental"
payments to the lender.58 The Court, however, disagreed with the Government
primarily because (1)legalities precluded the bank from borrowing directly from the
lender and (2) the taxpayer was clearly liable on the borrowing.59 Conceding that
"there is no simple device available to peel away the form of this transaction and to
reveal its substance,' ,6the Court found that the taxpayer was the party with its capital
invested in the building, and thus, was entitled to the interest deduction.6 '
ANCILLARY TAX PRINCIPLES AFFECTING
SUBSTANCE VERSUS FORM DocTRNE

Self-Dealing Versus Arm's-Length Transactions
The IRS seems to invoke the substance over form doctrine with greatest ease
SI Knetsch,

364 U.S. at 364-65.

5

2Id. at 368-69.

I at 366 (footnote omitted).
Id.
I.R.C. § 264(a)(2) (1991)now disallows interest deductions of the type claimed in Knetsch.
55
435 U.S. 561 (1978).
6
6 Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 563.
5
7Id. at 566.
58
Id.at 568-69.
5
9Id. at 582-84.
60Id. at 576.
61 id.
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self-dealing. 62

when the transaction involves
The form used in self-dealing transactions often has minimal, if any, nontax consequences, and is chosen solely because
it is expected to reduce taxes. For example, a purported credit sale of property by
parents to their children may, oninspection, be a gift of the property, because neither
the parents nor the children have taken seriously the purported obligation to pay the
agreed price. Self-dealing transactions between parent and subsidiary corporations
provide another set of tempting targets for legislative, administrative, and judicial
marksmen armed with the substance over form weapon.63
Arm's-length transactions between the taxpayer and independent parties are
far less vulnerable to substance over form attacks by the IRS than self-dealing
transactions.' For nontax reasons, the parties usually fully express their understanding in the documents so that the chosen form reflects the substance of the
transactions. The Seventh Circuit established this point in Campana Corp. v.
6 5 where it defined
Harrison,
an arm's-length transaction as a sale between parties
with adverse economic interests.' "66
Differing Tax Interests
Differing tax interests on behalf of the parties to the transaction also normally
make the substance and form of the transactions more congruent. For example, when
a business pays an employee for services, the desire to deduct the payment as a
business expense usually leads the employer to resist the employees suggestions to
disguise the payment as a tax-free gift. This principle does not hold in all cases,
however. For instance, if the employer in the above example is a tax-exempt
organization or a persistently unsuccessful enterprise with more deductions than it
can use, it may be willing to cooperate with the employee as a costless gesture of
charity or in return for a concession by the employee. A similar bargain may be
struck when two parties expect to be taxed at significantly different tax rates, and
they can devise a legal form that will assign the tax advantages to the party who can
best use them. For example, a husband may be willing to pay more in alimony
because his right to deduct the payment will reduce his taxes more than the extra
alimony will increase the wife's taxes. Similarly, a railroad or airline company with
' See, e.g., Campana Corp. v. Harrison, 114 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1940); Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, 7

T.C. 1129 (1946), aff d, 165 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1948); 58th Street Plaza Theatre v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.
469 (1951), affd, 195 F. 2d 724 (2d Cir. 1952); Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 882
(1951), affd on this point, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1952); Gladys Chessman Evans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.
798 (1958); Winters v. Dallman, 238 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. 58th Street Plaza Theatre,
287 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
6
See, e.g., Crown Cork Int'l. Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 19, affd, 149 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1945); Bank
of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 544, aff d, 193 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1951);
A. Arena & Co., Ltd. v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 505 (S.D. Cal. 1952). Nat'l Lead Co. v. Commissioner,
336 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1964).
64See Campana Corp., 114 F.2d 400.
65
1d.
66Id.
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a long history of losses may be willing to lease rather than buy equipment, so that
the lessor can derive the tax benefits that otherwise would be useless to the lessee.
Finally, tax shelters tend tobe successful because they are able to shift tax allowances
to investors who can deduct them from their top bracket taxable income.
Substance of Arm's-Length Transactionnot Always Upheld
In Campana, the court made it clear that the form of a transaction will not
automatically be disregarded in a non-arm's-length transaction. 67 Generally, if a
transaction is housed in a form that fairly reflects its substance, it will withstand
scrutiny despite the conscious pursuit of tax benefits. In this respect, the transaction
resembles an individual taxpayer's isolated decision to pursue a tax-minimizing
route rather than a taxable one. On the other hand, if the form of a transaction does
not coincide with its substance, the fact that it was negotiated at arm 's-length by
unrelated parties will not protect it against attack by the IRS. For example, the IRS
may apply the substance over form doctrine to treat a purported lease of business
equipment as a sale if the lessee has the option to purchase the property at a nominal
amount at the end of the lease term, or if the lease term is equal to the anticipated
useful life of the property.6
Business Purpose Versus Tax Avoidance
As previously noted, the business purpose test originated with the Supreme
Court's decision in Gregoryv. Helvering.6 9 In Gregory,the Court held that there was
not a statutory reorganization, even though the taxpayer complied with the literal
terms of Section 112(g) of the 1928 Act, because the transaction lacked a bona fide
business purpose. The regulations restate this business purpose requirement in two
sections--regulations section 1.368-1(b) and (c).
The IRS and the courts frequently apply the business purpose test to strike
down purported reorganizations where the motive is tax avoidance.'0 Generally, the
taxpayer must respond by establishing or proving a business purpose. However, in
several cases involving liquidation-reincorporation transactions, the courts have required D reorganization treatment, even though the taxpayer argued that there was
no business purpose for a reorganization, as opposed to a liquidation. In these cases,
the courts have held that the existence of a business purpose for a liquidation, and
the absence of a tax avoidance motive, do not preclude a transaction from qualifying
'7 See generally id.
sSee, e.g., Truman Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 446 (1949); Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2, C.B. 39; East
Coast Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 112, aff d, 222 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1955); Oesterreich v,
Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955); Wilshire Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 51 (9th
Cir. 1958); Lemon v. United States, 115 F. Supp 573 (W.D. Va. 1953).
6 Gregory, 293 United States 465.
7
See discussion in Wortham Machinery Co. v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff d,
521 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1975).
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as a D reorganization when all the technical requirements for such a reorganization
are met.7'
Corporateor ShareholderBusiness Purpose?
Current regulations seem to focus on the existence of a corporate business
purpose for a reorganization. 72 The early cases following Gregory also seemed to
require a corporate business purpose. Subsequent cases, however, have rejected this
approach in favor of an evaluation of all the nontax motives of both the corporations
and shareholders involved. 73 In Lauri v. Commissioner,74 for example, the Sixth
Circuit held that the preservation of the goodwill and business reputation of the
acquiring company and the shareholders constituted a valid business purpose for the
merger. Additionally, the assured continuance of air charter and repair services,
upon which the acquiring company depended heavily, constituted a valid business
purpose for the acquisition of its sister corporation, an air service company.
Test not Restricted to CorporateReorganizations
Despite the fact that it originated in a reorganization case, application of the
business purpose test has not been restricted to reorganizations. The Supreme Court
applied a similartest to determine whether the separate entity of a corporation should
be disregarded." Other courts have applied the test to leaseback transactions, 76 and
the IRS has announced that it will apply a stringent business purpose test to
reinsurance arrangements between domestic and foreign reinsurers where a close
relationship exists.77
Step-Transactions
Where a series of steps resulting in a change of interest occurs, the issue arises
as to whether to consider each step separately, or to consider in their entirety the steps
resulting in a complete transaction, thereby giving effect to the whole transaction
rather than any of its separate parts. The step-transaction doctrine requires the
latter--i.e., it treats formally separate steps as a single transaction if the steps are in
substance integrated, interdependent, and focused towards a particular result.78
Thus, the step-transaction doctrine represents a corollary to the substance over form
"' Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'g 70 T.C. 86 (1978), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 836 (1980); Rose v. United States, 640 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1981); Simon v. Commissioner, 644 F.2d
339 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'g I T.C. 416 (1978).
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) and (c) (1990).
'3 Compare Lewis v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1080 (1948), affd, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949); and
Parshelsky Est. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 946 (1960), rev'd, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962); Rafferty v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 490 (1970), affd, 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972).
7"Lauri v. Commissioner, 653 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1981).
's Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).

7' Ernest v. Berry, 33 T.C.M. (P.H. 64, 181) (1964); 55 T.C.M. (PH $ 86, 249) (1986).
77Announc. 61-26 (TIR 300).
I See Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1427-29 (1987).
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principle. 79

The doctrine originated and has been applied, for the most part, in
corporate reorganization cases, but it is not limited to these situations."
While it is usually comparatively simple to foresee the results that flow from
applying the step-transaction doctrine, it is more difficult to predict whether the
courts or the IRS will adopt it as the proper method of analyzing a set of facts. At
one extreme, if the parties to a transaction agree to take a series of steps, no one of
which will be legally effective unless all are consummated, application of the steptransaction doctrine ordinarily is assured. However, in the absence of an all or
nothing plan, predictions are more uncertain. An independent series of steps may
occur simultaneously or in rapid succession, enabling the taxpayer to claim that he
is engaged in negotiations or has a lawyer on retainer to achieve several independent
objectives, each of which could be pursued on its own if the others have to be
abandoned. Recognizing the potential for dispute, the courts have used three tests
or standards to determine when and how to apply the step-transaction doctrine: (1)
end result test, (2) interdependence test, and (3) binding commitment test. In many
cases, the courts apply all three tests because the boundaries of the tests are not
distinct, but, instead, overlap.
End Result Test
The most far-reaching test under the step-transaction doctrine looks to the end
result of a series of transactions for economic substance. Separate transactions will
be consolidated into a single transaction if it appears that they are component parts
of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching
the ultimate result. In essence, the test insures that "a given result at the end of a
straight path is not made a different result because [it was] reached by following a
devious path."'" In Gregory v. Helvering, the Supreme Court described the steptransaction doctrine in end result terms as...
a mere device which put[s] on the form of a corporate reorganization as
a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and
accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived
plan, not to reorganize the business or any part of the business, but to
transfer a parcel of corporate shares...." 82
The end result test is based upon the assumption that a given end result should
have the same tax effect, whether achieved directly or through several intervening
steps. In a number of rulings involving reorganizations, the Service has ruled that
'9Security Industrial Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1983).

" Bessie Lasky, 23 T.C. 13, dismissed 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), affd without discussion of this point,
305 U.S. 1027 (1957). See Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Redemptions, 12 N.Y.U. INSTrr.
oN FED. TAX'N. 247 (1954).

8 Minnesota Tea, 302 U.S. at 613.
Gregory, 293 U. S. at 465.
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the transitory existence of a corporation involved in a reorganization is to be
disregarded for purposes of determining the tax consequences of the transaction.
These rulings looked to the substance or end result of the transaction to determine
83
tax treatment.
Mutual Interdependence Test
Under the mutual interdependence test, the court must ascertain whether the
individual transactions are" so interdependent that the legal relationship created by
one transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the series".184 The
test focuses on the relationship between the steps, rather than on their end result.
Each step is examined separately to determine Whether it has a reasonable economic
justification for standing alone, or whether its success depends on successful
completion of each of the other steps.
A number of cases have cited or used the mutual interdependence test to apply
the step transaction doctrine.85 For example, where an entity acts as a conduit, having
no business purpose of its own and merely acting to secure the taxpayer's literal
compliance with the applicable provisions of law, mutual interdependency is almost
always cited as justification for invoking the step-transaction doctrine.86 Conversely, intermediate transactions that add nothing to the completed affair and
represent only transitory phases of an arrangement may escape the step-transaction
doctrine because of the lack of mutual interdependency.87 The IRS, describing both
the end result and mutual interdependence tests, holds that "threshold steps" will not
be subject to the step transaction doctrine when:
[s]uch preliminary activity results in a permanent alteration of a
previous bona fide business relationship. Thus, the substance of each
of a series of steps will be recognized and the step transaction doctrine
will not apply, if each such step demonstrates independent economic
significance, is not subject to attack as a sham, and was undertaken for
valid business purposes and not mere avoidance of taxes.88
Binding Commitment Test
The third and most restrictive test for applying the step-transaction doctrine
83

Rev. Rul. 67-448; 1967-2 C.B. 144; Rev. Rul. 73-427, 1973-2 C.B. 301; Rev. Rul. 78-250, 1978-1 C.B.

83; Rev. Rul. 83-142, 1983-2 C.B. 68.
' Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1980).

1 Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone, 315 U.S. 179 (1942); American Bantam Car v. Commis-

sioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), affd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Dunlap
& Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 542 (1967); Stephens v. United States, 464 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1972),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1118 (1973); Security Industrial Ins. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1983);
McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d (7th Cir. 1982), rev'g 76 T.C. 972 (1981).
8 West Coast Marketing, 46 T.C. at 32.
' 7 Alabama Asphaltic Limestone, 315 U. S. at 179.

"Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156.
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is the binding commitment test formulated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner
v. Gordon. 9 This test permits application of the step-transaction doctrine where the
taxpayer is subject to an obligation or a binding commitment to pursue the
successive steps in a series of transactions. The difficulty in applying the test arises
because of the greater certainty required to determine whether a transaction spanning
several tax years should be consolidated.
The situation in Gordon involved a corporation's distribution of all or a controlling amount of stock in a controlled corporation pursuant to a reorganization
under Section 355. The issue was whether a distribution of 57 percent of the stock
of the controlled corporation in one year could be combined with a distribution of
the remaining 43 percent of the stock two years later for purposes of satisfying the
50 percent control requirement. The Court refused to combine the transfers, and thus
found nonrecognition treatment under Section 355 inapplicable, because there was
no binding commitment to take the latter steps when the initial steps were taken. In
the Court's view, "if one transaction is to be characterized as a 'first step' there must
be a binding commitment to take the latter steps.'"90
Subsequent decisions have somewhat limited the application of the binding
commitment test. In King Enterprises,Inc. v. U.S.,91 the Court of Claims held that
the Supreme Court did not intend for the binding commitment test to affect the
application of the step-transaction doctrine in other types of transactions, and that
Gordon must be limited to its facts. Other courts also have reviewed the binding
commitment test and concluded that the lack of a binding commitment should be
determinative only in cases involving multi-year transactions, and that in other
situations, the presence or absence of a binding commitment is only one factor to
consider in applying the step-transaction doctrine. 92
SUBSTANCE OR FORM: WHICH PREVAILS AND WHO MAY
SUCCESSFULLY INVOKE TiE DOCTRINE?

The IRS, rather than the taxpayer, normally invokes the substance versus form
issue and argues that the substance of the transaction should override its form.

Occasionally, however, the rules are reversed, with the IRS contending that the
taxpayer should be bound by the form in which the transaction was cast, and the
taxpayer arguing that the substance of the transaction differs from its form and
should control. Thus, whether substance or form will prevail, and who may

successfully invoke the substance over form doctrine, depends upon the facts of the
case and the court's view of these facts.
"Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U. S. 83 (1968).
90Id.
9 King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 511 (Ct. C1. 1969).
1 Redding v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 597 (1979); McDonald's 688 F.2d 520; Security Industrial, 702 F.2d
1234.
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Extreme Positions Taken by Courts
The courts provide two extremes for the substance versus form issue. At one
end of the spectrum, taxpayers are told that the IRS can cut through the red tape if
it wishes, but that it is equally free to leave them entangled in the form they select. 93
The traditional elements of the legal principle of estoppel support the judicial refusal
to permit taxpayers to repudiate their own handiwork. Correcting the prior years'
returns of the taxpayer and other parties to the transaction may be administratively
difficult, and perhaps impossible, because of faded memories and expiring statutes
of limitation.9 But, even when no irretrievable waves have been set in motion, the
courts may deny a taxpayer the right to use the substance over form doctrine.
Justifying such a position, the Second Circuit states:
It would be quite intolerable to pyramid the existing complexities of tax
law by a rule that the tax shall be that resulting from the form of transaction taxpayers have chosen or from any other form they might have
chosen, whichever is less.95
At the opposite extreme, many cases hold that the substance over form
doctrine is a two-way street, open to the taxpayer as well as the IRS. Justifying this
attitude, the Ninth Circuit states: "One should not be garroted by the tax collector
for calling one's agreement by the wrong name.' '96 In a similar way, the Supreme
Court permitted taxpayers to repudiate a tax-oriented contract on showing that its
form conflicted with economic reality despite the IRS's willingness to accept the
contract as written.97 The case involved an effort to shift liability for social security
taxes on the wages of musicians from bandleaders to ballroom operators by vesting
the latter with rights under a standard union contract that were not intended to be
enforced. Despite a denial of the employment realities, the IRS was willing to accept
the agreement, perhaps because the ballroom operators were more responsible taxpayers than the bandleaders. However, the Supreme Court allowed the operators to
repudiate the fictitious employer-employee relationship.
Between these two extremes are cases that allow taxpayers to escape the forms
selected by them, but impose a more stringent burden of proof than is normally
applied in tax cases. Describing this middle ground, the Tax Court states that "the
so-called 'two-way street' seems to run downhill for the Commissioner and uphill
for the taxpayer".1 For example, when the sales price of a going business is allocated
by the parties among its assets (e.g., inventory, depreciable assets, noncompete convenant), some courts permit a repudiation of the agreed allocation by the buyer or
Burnet, 287 U. S.415; Higgins,308 U. S. 473.
Unvert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 807 (1979), affd, 656 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1981).
9'Television Industry v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 322 325 (2d Cir. 1960).
"Pacific Rock & Gravel Co. v. United States, 297 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir. 1961).
"Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 United States 126 (1947).
"Rogers v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (P.H. 70, 192) (1970).
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seller only on "strong proof" of its failure to reflect economic reality. 99 However,
the Third Circuit has allowed the taxpayer to repudiate the allocation only on
showing that it was induced by mistake or fraud."°
Abstruseness Extends to Ancillary Principles
The abstruse nature of the courts' decisions on substance versus form is
equally applicable to the ancillary principles. The First Circuit has held that the
business purpose test is not "controlled by whether in a particular case it is to the
Additionally, the Tax Court has
advantage of [the IRS] or of the taxpayer.... " 101
criticized the IRS for going too far in attacking a transaction for lack of business
purpose,"1° and the Fifth Circuit has made it clear that the transaction will be
respected even if the taxpayer has a tax avoidance purpose. 0 3 Despite these hints
of flexibility, case law generally does not support a taxpayer who wants to disavow
the form of a transaction for lack of business purpose. The courts are well aware that
a business purpose generally is devised in the offices of the taxpayer's tax advisers,
and to allow the taxpayer to produce documentation of business purpose at will
would undermine the entire purpose of the test. For example, a taxpayer may want
a reorganization transaction to be taxable in order to receive a step-up in asset basis
or to recognize a loss. In such instances, the courts have not been swayed by
taxpayers who argue that the transaction should be taxable because of a lack of
business purpose. °0
Much of the difficulty in interpreting the arm's-length versus self-dealing
cases comes from the courts' tendency to simultaneously invoke other principles.
For example, many of the cases in which the business purpose test is applied involve
parties not having adverse economic interests, and thus, m ay not be dealing at arm'slength. 05 Whether the overriding concern of the court is self-dealing or lack of
business purpose cannot be discerned.
Determining when and how the courts will apply the step-transaction doctrine
probably is the most difficult of all the ancillary principles. In the usual case, the IRS
invokes the step-transaction doctrine to require the integration of parts of a single
transaction when the form of the transaction does not coincide with economic
reality. 106 The taxpayer, however, in limited circumstances, may invoke the steptransaction doctrine if the form of the transaction does not reflect his view of its
substance. On this point, the Sixth Circuit states:
The principle that one transaction may not be broken up into various
9 Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1959).
"0 Commissioner, v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (2d Cir. 1959).
"'1Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 648 (1st Cir. 1949).
10

W. P. Hobby v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 980 (1943).

'

Fender v. United States, 577 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1978).

'

Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1947).

sE.g., Crown Cork Int'l, 4 T.C. at 19.

' E.g., Court Holding, 324 U. S. at 331; Higgins, 308 U. S. at 473.
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elements to avoid a tax is not a single, but a double, edged sword, as it
also may not be broken into various elements to create a tax."
CORNERSTONE OF SOUND TAXATION OR LETHAL WEAPON?

The intricate nature of the decisions involving the substance over form
doctrine and the ancillary principles favors a "lethal weapon" interpretation of the
doctrine. Seemingly, the courts decide the issue on an ad hoc basis, reaching a
conclusion and then citing those cases that support the conclusion. If a court respects
the form of the transaction, it cites cases holding that a taxpayer is free to arrange his
affairs in a manner that results in the least taxes.0 8 Conversely, if a court ignores the
form of a transaction, it cites cases holding that substance governs form or that the
transaction was not at arm's-length, lacked a business purpose, or was part of a series
of integrated steps of a single transaction.' 9
Finding Certainty in Ad Hoc Decisions
While the ad hoc nature of the substance over form decisions cannot be
ignored, more certainty may exist in this area of tax law than a cursory review of case
law suggests. One commentator contends that tax analysts may predict whether a
court will respect the form of a transaction by considering the interplay of three
factors: (1) the potential characterizations of the substance of the transaction, (2) the
existence of a business purpose, and (3) the identity of the party (either the IRS or
the taxpayer) challenging the form of the transaction." Using these factors, four
general principles emerge:
1. If the substance of the transaction agrees with its form and no
alternative substance for recharacterizing the transaction exists, the
courts will respect the form of the transaction.
2. If the substance of the transaction cannot be reconciled with its form,
the courts will not respect the form of the transaction.
3. If the substance of the transaction agrees with its form, but the
transaction could with equal or less force be recharacterized as having
another substance, the courts will respect the form of the transaction.
4. If the substance of the transaction arguably agrees with its form, but
more reasonably does not agree with its form, the courts will not
respect the form of the transaction in the face of an IRS challenge,
107

Buhl v. Kavanagh, 118 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1941).

"0

E.g., United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U. S. 451 (1950); Chisholm, 79 F.2d 14 (2d

Cir, 1935).
'"E.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. 465.
Moore, Form v. Substance: When Will Courts Respect the Form of a Transaction?,J. TAx'N 66 (Feb.
1987).

"
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unless the taxpayer has a business purpose for the form of the
transaction. If the taxpayer, rather than the IRS, challenges the form
of the transaction in this situation, the courts are not likely to ignore
the form unless the taxpayer provides strong proof to the contrary."
Coping with the Step-TransactionDoctrine
While case law generally supports the four principles stated above, the
principles offer little guidance in how to cope with the step-transaction doctrine.
Several recent cases, however, indicate that the step-transaction doctrine, as well as
the related one of substance over form, may be easier for the taxpayer to overcome
than at any time in the past."' The IRS seems reluctant to argue its position on the
basis of the step-transaction doctrine (favoring instead the more general substance
over form doctrine), and the courts appear equally hesitant to apply it where the
taxpayer has rigidly adhered to the form of the transactions." 3 Thus, while the steptransaction doctrine has historically caused much anxiety because of its lack of
precision, recent cases suggest that it is less threatening--i.e., less of a lethal
weapon, and perhaps less of a cornerstone of sound taxation.
CoNcLUsIoN
In applying the tax laws to particular transactions, the IRS and the courts have
generally distinguished between form and substance, and asserted that transactions
are to be taken at face value for tax purposes only if they (1) are conducted at arm'slength, (2) are based on a business purpose or reflect economic reality, and (3)
integrate all steps in a prearranged plan, rather than give effect to each step as though
it were an isolated transaction. These presuppositions or criteria are so pervasive that
some interpret them as a preamble to the Internal Revenue Code, describing the
framework within which all statutory provisions are to function. Others, however,
believe that these judicial presuppositions or criteria are more successful in
establishing attitudes and moods than in supplying crisp answers to specific
questions, and, thus, consider them merely weapons--usually lethal--in the IRS's
arsenal. The truth probably lies somewhere in between these extremes--i.e., the
substance over form doctrine and the ancillary principles of arm 's-length, business
purpose, and step-transaction are not only the cornerstones of the federal tax system,
but also lethal weapons in the IRS's arsenal.

Id.
2

" Anderson v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 138 (1989); Tandy Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1165 (1989);
Cal-Maine Foods v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 181 (1989); Esmarkv. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), af 'd,

886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
n' See Wood, Is Step-TransactionDoctrine Still a Threatfor Taxpayers?,J. TAx'N 296 (May 1990).
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